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Prohibition, Boundaries and Exclusion in the Divine Comedy 
 
Many have already remarked that Dante’s Comedy is indeed the most 
comprehensive synthesis of medieval life. It is no wonder then that—
in providing a faithful reflection of medieval mentality—it contains, 
among other things, an elaborately worked out semiotics for 
prohibition, delimitation, discrimination, exclusion and expulsion. 
Prohibition is, in effect, the organizing principle of the moral order 
within the poem. On the one hand, this follows straightforwardly 
from the way that law and sin, prohibition and the Fall are conceived 
to be interconnected within Christian teachings. In addition, it also 
follows from an essential feature of the world in which Dante lived, 
and which he recreated in his poem: that people’s lives were governed 
by a multitude of prohibitions. The poet describes the fates he 
encounters during his otherworldly journey as examples of sin and 
punishment, of justice issuing rewards or punishment, all 
consequences of obeying or defying such prohibitions. 
According to Dante, commands involving prohibitions serve as 
foundations for the moral order not merely in the trivial sense that 
doing what is prohibited is sinful, but also in a more profound sense: 
that acts can acquire a moral sense only in a world that is entrenched 
by prohibitions. Bearing witness to this, the most important passage 
can be found in Canto XXVI of Paradise, where Adam speaks about 
the original sin and his expulsion from paradise: 
 
[...] the tasting of the tree was not by itself the cause of so great 
an exile, but only / the overpassing of the bound. 
(Paradise, XXVI. 115-117.)1 
 
                                                 
1
 Or, figliuol mio, non il gustar del legno/ Fu per sé la cagion di tanto esilio,/ 
Ma solamente il trapassar del segno. (English translation: Dante 1952 (1984)). 
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Adam’s sin is therefore related to the symbolic, rather than the 
material aspect of his action. The Fall was the result of a prohibition 
being violated, not merely an action that was bad in itself—the 
taking of the forbidden fruit. 
In major respects, this corresponds to Saint Thomas Aquinas’s 
conception, according to which in the case of the Fall, it is not the act 
itself that should be regarded as sinful, since, as he explained, it is no 
sin at all to desire knowledge and to wish to resemble god with 
respect to his knowledge. Thomas’s primary emphasis is on the 
intemperance apparent in performing the act, which consisted in 
Adam’s wanting to resemble god too much. His sin is that he 
overstepped a certain boundary, “il trapassar del segno,” as Dante 
also noted. And this is precisely what pride is,2 which is the chief sin 
within the system of The Divine Comedy. 
The thought that sin’s origins are to be found in the symbolic 
sphere, can be even more easily discerned from Paul’s words: “but 
sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all 
manner of coveting: for apart from the law sin is dead” (Rom, 7:8).  
This explanation of the roots of sin contains the legal principle that 
without law there is no sin, as the apostle elsewhere states explicitly: 
“but sin is not imputed when there is no law” (Rom, 5:13), “through 
the commandment sin might become exceeding sinful”. (Rom, 7:13) 3 
In this Paradise-episode, the question of the origin of language is 
also known to arise. Using Adam as his mouthpiece, Dante explicates 
a new and rather original theory—with respect to both the tradition 
and his views in De Vulgari Eloquentia—according to which language 
is not a gift from god, but Adam’s creation. It is no accident that the 
two themes are interconnected. Just as the first sin was committed by 
the first man, he was also the one to utter the first words. In other 
words: the origins of sin and of language are one and the same.  
Thus a strong symbolic link exists between sin and language. This 
is enforced by the fact that when Dante describes Adam’s sin, he uses 
                                                 
2 See Thomas Aquinas 1952 (1984), II, CLXIII, 1-2. 
3 Quotations from the American Standard Version of the Holy Bible.  
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the word “segno”, which in his language simultaneously means, 
among other things, “boundary,” “measure,” and “sign.” Adam 
therefore crosses the boundary by disregarding the sign and thereby 
opposing god. He rationalizes the fact that god had placed the tree 
there as a sign, and had endowed it with a certain significance. 
The interconnection between sin and language also crops up in 
other places that are fundamental to the interpretation of the poem 
as a whole. One of these is the Odysseus-episode in Canto XXVI of 
Hell. The following brief remarks about the episode should be noted: 
(1) Odysseus is the poet’s alter ego, (2) Odysseus’s sin as a fandi factor 
is also a language-related sin, (3) enclosed within a tongue of flames 
with the underworld, Odysseus’s penitence is through or by 
language, in accordance with the principle of contrapasso (an eye for 
an eye, a tooth for a tooth), appearing as a flame in front of Dante 
(“as if it were the tongue that spoke” - Hell, XXVI. 85-90.). 
This link is so strong that the punishment for those who had 
committed suicide (Hell, XIII) as well as for Nimrod (Hell XXXI) also 
becomes linguistic in nature. In each of these cases, we are justified 
in talking about a case of “linguistic contrapasso.”4 Those who 
committed suicide have thrown away life, depriving themselves of 
the essence of their humanity, and as a result, the most distinctive 
human characteristic, speech becomes a source of eternal suffering 
for them. They turn into trees and every one of their words streams 
forth with blood spurting out from their wounds where their twigs 
and branches used to be before having been broken off. (“Who was 
thou, who through so many wounds blowest forst with blood a 
woeful speech?” - Hell, XIII. 137-138.) Nimrod, who out of excessive 
pride convinced people to build the tower of Babel, ends up losing 
his humanity through garbled and nonsensical speech. His 
punishment excludes him from human communities. (“Let us leave 
him alone, and not speak in vain; for such is every language to him, 
as his to others which is known to no one.” - Hell, XXXI. 77-81.) 
                                                 
4 I have already considered this question in Kelemen 1994.  
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Of course, the figure of Odysseus is endowed with special 
significance through the fact that we can recognize in him the 
likeness of the poet. It is obviously no coincidence that in 
comparison to all other characters in Hell, his is the story in which 
the greatest emphasis is placed on a prohibition being violated, on a 
boundary being crossed, on the motif of disregarding a sign. Let us 
remind ourselves of the story’s structure: upon leaving Circe’s 
island, Odysseus and his remaining companions set off yet again, 
and after passing the Straits of Gibraltar, where the Pillars of 
Hercules mark the border of the world, they reach the mountain of 
Purgatory in the middle of the ocean, at the shore of which they are 
shipwrecked. The relevant lines are as follows:  
 
I and my companions were old and slow when we came to 
that narrow strait where / Hercules set up his bounds, to the 
end that man should not put out beyond.      
 
     Io e ’ compagni eravam vecchi e tardi 
          quando venimmo a quella foce stretta 
          dov’ Ercole segnó li suoi riguardi 
     Acciò che l’uom piú oltre non si metta. 
                                                 (Hell, XXVI. 106-109.) 
 
Immediately after the reference to the Pillars of Hercules, we read 
Ulysses’s famous speech, through which this great master of 
persuasion convinces his crew to undertake the final journey:  
 
Consider your origin; ye were not made to live as brutes, but 
pursue virtue and / knowledge. 
 
     Considerate la vostra semenza: 
          fatti non foste a viver come bruti, 
          ma per seguir virtute e canoscenza. 




The parallel between Adam and Odysseus already becomes 
striking at the first glance. Just as the first man attempts to acquire 
knowledge by plucking the forbidden fruit, the Greek hero is driven 
by his desire for knowledge to sail past the boundary marked by the 
Pillars of Hercules. We know all too well how wide the range of 
possibilities for interpreting the Odysseus-episode is, but 
fortunately, these bear little connection to the present inquiry. We 
should, however, make one remark. In the light of the parallel 
between Adam and Odysseus, and taking into account Thomas’s 
interpretation of the original sin, Odysseus’ case, like Adam’s, can be 
regarded as one in which the quest for acquiring knowledge does 
not in and of itself constitute a sin. Odysseus’s sin is not what he 
describes as “the ardor which I had to become experienced of the 
world, and of the vices of men, and of their virtue” (Hell, XXVI. 97-
99.), but rather the fact that he has crossed the boundary (and he did 
literally do so) and thereby violated the prohibition. For his case, too, 
the words describing Adam’s act are perfectly fitting: „il trapassare 
del segno.” At the level of semantics, this is supported by the fact 
that in the line (108.) referring to the border that cannot be crossed, 
we encounter yet again the semantic content of “sign” and “signal” 
in connection with various lexemes: „dov’ Ercole segnó li suoi 
riguardi” (“Segno” appears here as a verb: and “segnò” on the 
“riguardi” should be understood as a warning inscription, border 
marking). This way, the literal meaning of the line is as follows: 
“where Hercules inscribed his sign (inscription).”5 
We can be certain about the sense attributed to the Pillars of 
Hercules. They serve to signal more than just a border, they are signs 
of warning and prohibition as well: they are there so “that man 
should not put out beyond” (109.) Disregarding the sign is 
                                                 
5 Witte’s German translation corresponds to this: “Wo Herkules die Zeichen 
setzte”. Dante 1945. 101. 
In a work by Brunetto Latini, Dante’s mentor, entitled Tesoretto, Hercules is 
said to have “put there as signals “ (“vi pose per segnale”) “great columns to 
show people that the earth ends there and tarminates”.  See Singleton’s 
commentary of the Comedy: Singleton 1989 (Inferno, 2.) 1989. 465. 
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inescapable and the punishment is comparable to that of Adam’s. 
The punishments received by Odysseus and Adam are structural 
counterparts of one another, just like their sins are. Odysseus is 
shipwrecked at the foot of Purgatory, on the top of which is earthly 
paradise. Meanwhile, Adam was expelled form earthly paradise, 
losing immortality for him and his descendants (he therefore died in 
a symbolic sense). Odysseus’s journey is accordingly an attempt at 
returning to the starting point for humans prior to the expulsion 
from paradise. This is why it was forbidden to sail past the Pillars of 
Hercules, and this is why Odysseus’s fate repeats Adam’s: he is 
effectively expelled from paradise through his ship being wrecked 
and through being sent to hell.  
We have already emphasized that Adam’s and Odysseus’s sins 
are symbolic, semiotic in nature, if you like: they consist in the two 
men neglecting the sign. But in Odysseus’s case, the prohibition 
refers to the crossing of a concrete, spatial boundary—a geographic 
border in the fully literal sense. In describing this, Dante follows an 
existing tradition which can provide further help in understanding 
the Odysseus-episode. 
Starting with Strabon, several authors from antiquity and medieval 
times have written about the Pillars of Hercules,6 recalling a Hercules-
temple decorated by Phoenician columns (not mentioning initially the 
prohibition for sailing through the straits). Certain Arabic sources7 also 
include accounts of a copper statue depicting a man with a long beard 
enrobed in a golden cloak, turning towards the east, and pointing at 
the strait behind him with a prohibitive motion of his hand, meaning 
“no further.” The sources also tell about an inscription on the cliff 
wall, reading „non plus ultra.” This is the same expression as the one 
Dante used in line 109: piú oltre non. 
                                                 
6 Maria Corti gives a detailed account of the various sources from antiquity: 
Corti 1993. See the sections entitled “Il divieto ovvero la navigazione 
proibita” (“Prohibition or Prohibited Sailing”) and “Canali di informazione 
arabo-castigliani (“Castilian-Arabic Information Channels”), 122-124.  
7 Corti 1993. See the section entitled “Canali di informazione arabo-
castigliani” (“Castilian-Arabic Information Channels”), 124-126. 
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As always, from the perspective of our present theme as well, we 
should distinguish between descriptions of the afterworld on the one 
hand, and those earthly stories about which Dante is informed 
during his otherworldly encounters. Accounts of the physical 
location of hell and the purgatory generally include descriptions of 
their boundaries and the vicissitudes involved in crossing these 
boundaries. In these cases, the boundaries are not without symbolic 
meaning, but they still primarily remind us of “geographic” borders, 
due to the fact that Dante has elaborately worked out the topography 
of hell and of the purgatory. By contrast, paradise presents a 
completely different image. Because it is no physical-spatial place, its 
various circles are not separated by boundaries from each other or 
from earthly paradise on top of the mountain of Purgatory. From 
earthly paradise, Dante flies into the skies in an unconscious state, in 
a single flash: “lightning, flying from its proper site, never ran as 
thou who art returning thereunto.” (Paradise, I. 93.). 
Let us examine some types of boundaries in hell and in the 
purgatory: 
Everyone knows that at the semiotically marked boundary 
separating hell from the world of the living, one must pass through a 
gate with the inscription (“Through me is the way into the wouful city 
[…]”, etc. – Hell, III. 1-9.). This, in contrast with the inscription on the 
Pillars of Hercules, does not serve to prohibit, but to inform, announcing 
(along with numerous other signs with a similar function) who are 
allowed to enter the given area and what they should expect (no hope). 
It is also a border marking sign, just like contemporary signs with scripts 
like “boundary of Budapest,” “country border,” and many other similar 
signs.8 But the gate is not all. The real boundary, in accordance with the 
classic tradition, is Acheron, whose ferryman, Charon is also a border 
guard keeping a watchful eye to make sure that only those who are 
entitled will get into his boat to cross over to the other side. The 
encounter with him is followed by a sequence of scenes with repetitions 
                                                 
8 In this instance, Dante is following a practice already familiar. In his era, it 
was common custom to place inscriptions alongside coats-of-arms and other 
badges on houses and especially on buildings with a sacred function.  
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of almost ritualistic monotony: each time, the guard recognizes that 
Dante is one of the living, and prohibits him from entering (“thou who 
art there, living soul, depart from these that are dead” – Hell, III. 89), and 
Virgil secures permission to carry on through appeal to a higher will: 
 
And my Leader to him: “Charon, vex not thyself; it is thus 
willed there where is power / for that which is willed; and ask 
no more.”     (Hell, III. 94-96.) 
 
The same ceremony recurs at the entry into the purgatory. The 
realm of the purgatory, with an entirely different set of laws, still has 
a guard: Cato of Utica, the Roman hero who sacrificed his life for 
freedom. His figure commands respects and is quite the opposite of 
the mythical and rude Charon’s figure, but is no less strict and 
vigilant than him. The two travelers have to throw themselves to the 
ground and Virgil has to give a long speech in order for them to gain 
admission. The speech is one of several splendid rhetorical feats 
within the Divine Comedy, containing every tried and tested element 
for influencing the audience, ranging from appeal to a higher 
command to rational explanations and strategically placed mention 
of captatio benevolentiae. A beautiful example of this is the reference to 
the hero’s love of freedom: 
 
Now may it please thee to look graciously upon his coming. 
He goes seeking liberty, / which is so dear, as he knows who 
for it renounces life.    (Purgatory, I. 70-74.) 
 
Meanwhile, appealing to the character of the great Roman 
nobleman is not enough.9 In the end, Virgil manages to soften the 
stern guard only by reminding him of his love for his wife Marcia, 
and promising to convey to her the guard’s greetings:  
                                                 
9 I would like to note a loosely related point: perhaps this is an example of 
Dante’s irony and self-irony, since the poet suggests that there are far too 
many words. For at one point Cato has had enough of the speech: “But if a 
Lady of Heaven move and direct thee, as thou sayest, there is no need of 




For her love, then, incline thyself to us; allow us to go on 
through thy seven realms: / I will report this grace from thee 
to her […]. 
 (Purgatory, I. 81-83.) 
 
The situation in the purgatory resembles the preliminary events 
in hell in a further respect: the function of border crossing 
regulations are twofold. Much like during their journey into the 
underworld—where Dante and Virgil had to pass through the gates 
of hell and then had to cross the Acheron in Charon’s boat—on the 
way to the purgatory, they have to request admission from Cato, 
while the souls awaiting penitence are carried across the sea by the 
angel of god, the heavenly ferryman, and deposited on the island of 
purgatory. But this gets us no further than the foot of the mountain 
yet. In order for the travelers to be admitted into the purgatory itself, 
they have to cross yet another border and first go through the 
ceremony—already familiar from previous episodes—of negotiating 
with the guard. This time around, the guard is an angel with a 
sword, who etches the P’s representing the seven sins onto Dante’s 
forehead (each of which will be erased by an angel upon entering the 
next circle). Here then the admission ceremony is complemented by 
branding, physically marking the entering individuals.   
Perhaps the most paradoxical example of prohibition and 
exclusion within hell is offered by the city of Dis. The travelers have 
to sail through the sea of mud in Styx, in order to reach the giant 
fortress surrounded by a rampart and moat: 
 
We at last arrived within the deep ditches which encompass 
that disconsolate city. / The walls seemed to me to be of iron. 
 (Hell, VIII. 76-79.) 
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At the city gates (which recalls the memory of the gates of hell)10 a 
siege-like situation develops, but in the opposite sense: here, the 
demonic inhabitants of the city are the ones who react aggressively 
towards those requesting entry. The logic of exclusion works in reverse. 
The travelers wish to enter a place whose gates the angry guards slam in 
front of the negotiating Virgil („These our adversaries closed the gates 
on the breast of my Lord, who remaind without” – Hell, VIII. 115.)—a 
place that is the city of horrors and a perfect opposite of the noble castle 
visited in Limbo. This time around the negotiations between the guards 
and those seeking entry, ends in failure. For despite Virgil encouraging 
his protégé (“I shall win the contest, whoever circle round within for the 
defence” - Hell, VIII. 123.), they cannot get past the walls without the 
help of an angel sent from above. 
As we see from the foregoing, hell and purgatory have 
characteristic natural boundaries: the river and the sea. We should 
add that several other rivers described in the Comedy serve the same 
function. A nice little brook surrounds the ancient castle in Limbo, 
where Homer leads Dante and the accompanying poets. Also, Lethe 
and Eunoë, the two rivers of paradise flowing from the same origin, 
also serve as borders in a symbolic sense. The travelers reaching the 
ancient castle, whose idyllic surroundings strikingly resemble our 
encounter of earthly paradise, is described as follows:   
 
We came to the foot of a noble castle, seven times circled by 
high walls, defended round / about by a fair streamlet. This 
we passed as if hard ground; through seven gates I entered / 
with these sages; we came to a meadow of fresh verdure. 
 
     Venimmo al piè d’un nobile castello, 
          Sette volte cerchiato d’alte mura, 
          Difeso intorno d’un bel fiumicello. 
     Questo passammo come terra dura; 
          Per sette porte intrai con questi savi; 
          Giugnemmo in prato di fresca verdura.     (Hell, IV. 106-111.) 
                                                 
10 “This their insolence is not new, for of old they used it at a less secret gate, 
which still is found without a bolt. Above it thou didst see the dead 
inscription […]”. (Hell, VIII. 124-127.)  
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We are in an idyllic place, but entry is by no means simple. The 
nice little brook does not merely surround the castle, but also protects 
it („difeso intorno d’un bel fiumicello”); and even if it were an 
exaggeration to say that the castle is like a prison, still, it is 
surrounded by seven tall walls („cerchiato d’alte mura”), with seven 
gates. Prominent commentaries have it that the castle symbolizes 
human wisdom; the seven walls, the seven branches of philosophy; 
the seven gates, the trivium and the quadrivium; the stream, 
eloquence and experience. Whatever the allegorical meaning of the 
description might be, the image in front of us depicts a medieval castle 
surrounded by a wall and a moat, with the inhabitants—sages—living 
there shut off from the world. And the allegorical meaning is no 
different: the seven branches of philosophy (physics, metaphysics, 
ethics, politics, economics, mathematics and dialectics) encircle and 
protect the castle of knowledge. At this point, too, we are presented 
with a world in which the interconnections among exclusion, isolation 
and segregation are expressed in terms of divisions of physical space 
and various symbolic manifestations of social hierarchy alike. Social 
space is directly recreated in physical space.  
The forked river running through earthly paradise is not a 
boundary in a literal or physical sense. In one place though 
(when Matilda appears), the text expressly suggests that the 
small rives constitutes exactly the kind of boundary that the 
Hellespont is for others: 
 
The stream made us three paces apart; but the Hellespont 
where Xerxes passed it – still a curb on all human pride – 
endured not more hatred from Leander for swelling between 
Sestos and Abydos, than that from me because it did not then 
open.  
 (Purgatory, XXVIII. 70-75.) 
 
Despite this, the river’s border function is not purely symbolic: it 
separates the poet’s old and new selves from one another. The water 
of forgetting (Lethe) frees him of the sin (makes him forget the sin), 
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whilst the water of remembering (Eunoë) enforces virtue (makes him 
remember it). The poet becomes a new man by crossing the boundary. 
Purgatory is the cantica of freedom: the story of a traveler who has 
shrugged off his sins and was set free; one who has overstepped the 
boundary within whose confines he used to be a prisoner.  
Of the forms and types of discrimination and exclusion which 
structure the episodes of the Divine Comedy, from the theological 
point of view, the decisive one is, without a doubt, the opposition of 
Christians and non-Christians. They are separated by the kind of 
boundary that we have encountered above, and baptism is a gate 
into another world, just like those gates that Dante had passed 
through with the help of Virgil. Dante’s wording is by no means 
accidental then when he talks about the gate of faith when 
introducing the unsinning inhabitants of Limbo: 
 
[…] these did not sin; and though they have merits it suffices 
not, because they did not / have baptism, whis is port of the 
faith that thou believest. 
 
          […] ei non peccaro; e s’elli hanno mercedi, 
     non basta, perché non ebber battesmo, 
          ch’è porta de la fede che tu credi. 
 (Hell, IV. 34-36.) 
 
Of course, Dante introduces an innovation at this point as well, 
theologically, morally and poetically speaking. In Canto XIX of 
Paradise, staggering words appear about the doubt that the exclusion 
of non-Christians raises weighty questions. Is it just to condemn “a 
man who  is born on the bank of the Indus”, and “no one is there 
who may tell of Christ”? If “all his wishes and acts are good”, 
„where is his sin if he does not believe?” (Paradise, XIX. 70-78.)       
Dante’s other innovation relative to medieval conceptions of hell 
consists in his placing on the doorsteps of hell children as well as the 
greatest representatives of antiquity and Arabic culture. This is an 
important and telling compromise, which nevertheless leaves the 
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logic of segregation unaltered: the sages in question are confined to a 
place fenced off for them, even if that is not hell itself. 
The structure apparent in Paradise, whose world lacks hierarchic 
structure entirely, is of course very different from the one previously 
described. The saved souls are all equally close to god, and are not 
distributed into assigned spots. That we encounter them in 
apparently different circles which seem to be lower or higher, is just 
an allegoric demonstration of the fact that their merits are not equal:  
 
These showed themselves here, not because this sphere is 
allotted to them, but to / afford sign of the celestial grade 
which is least exalted. 
 (Paradise, IV. 37-39.) 
 
In contrast with the arrangement within hell, where in accordance 
with the principle of talion every sin has its own punishment, 
rewards in paradise are not issued in proportion to merit and 
everyone partakes in the same happiness. This is the allegoric 
expression of a kind of utopia that a different era has formulated as 
follows: “from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
needs.” This is the utopia that invalidates the logic within hell about 
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